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Abstract
While many international organisations have independent evaluations, including the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Health organization (WHO), uniquely the World Bank in its 2015 World Development 
Report sought to ascertain the potential biases that influence how its staff interpret evidence and influence 
policy. Here, we describe the World Bank’s study design, including experiments to ascertain the impact on 
Bank staff ’s judgements of complexity, confirmation bias, sunk cost bias, and an understanding of the wishes 
of those whom they seek to help. We then review the Bank’s proposed mechanisms to minimise the impact of 
the biases they identified. We argue that this approach, that we refer to as ‘reflective practice,’ deserves to be 
adopted more widely among institutions that seek to use evidence from research to inform policy and practice. 
Keywords: Reflective Practice, Cognitive Bias, Complexity, Evidence
Copyright: © 2016 by Kerman University of Medical Sciences
Citation: McKee M, Stuckler D. Reflective practice: how the World Bank explored its own biases? Int J Health 
Policy Manag. 2016;5(2):79–82. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2015.216
*Correspondence to:
Martin McKee 
Email: martin.mckee@lshtm.ac.uk
Article History:
Received: 9 October 2015
Accepted: 9 December 2015
ePublished: 10 December 2015
       Editorial
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2016, 5(2), 79–82 doi 10.15171/ijhpm.2015.216
On Advising Others
International organisations often give advice – to others. They 
analyse the world as they see it, review the evidence they have 
found, and offer prescriptions, frequently to governments, 
about what should be done. Take, for example, recent World 
Health Reports, published by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), which propose measures to achieve universal health 
coverage, strengthen primary care, increase global health 
security, and tackle the AIDS epidemic. UNICEF’s State of 
the World’s Children reports have recently looked at data for 
policy (“every child counts”), children with disabilities, and 
children in urban settings. 
Sometimes the organisations writing these reports do reflect 
on what they, themselves are doing, particularly when things 
have gone wrong. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
for example, has an Independent Evaluation Office (although 
the IMF has been criticised for not heeding its findings). 
The WHO recently launched an investigation into its heavily 
criticised response to the Ebola outbreak.1 It is, however, very 
rare for international organisations to reflect publicly on 
how they think about the world and what this means for the 
policies they recommend. 
Yet this is just what the World Bank has now done. The 
researchers preparing the 2015 World Development Report2 
have looked at how individual World Bank staff make 
decisions, drawing on theory and empirical research to 
challenge the ideologies that members of its staff may hold.
The World Bank study – a rare case of analysis of an institution’s 
own potential internal and subconscious biases – arose from 
concerns within the Bank that its staff were making decisions 
that did not reflect reality on the ground. The authors invoked 
a study showing that 42% of Bank staff predicted that ‘most 
of the poor’ in Nairobi would agree with the statement that 
“vaccines are risky because they can cause sterilization,” yet 
in fact only 11% of those poor people who were surveyed in 
Nairobi did agree with it. Moreover, immunisation rates in that 
population exceeded 80%. Importantly, proximity to the poor 
had little effect; they found minimal difference between staff 
in country offices and those in the Washington headquarters, 
or between those working on poverty and those working on 
other issues. They concluded that there was a “shared mental 
model, not tempered by direct exposure to poverty” in the 
Bank, which acted as an organisational ideology, incubated 
and spread throughout the institution’s culture.
In this editorial, we review what the World Bank did, including 
the experiments it undertook to understand how its staff make 
decisions and the extent to which they empathised (or not) 
with the lives of those whom they wish to help. We conclude 
with recommendations for all organisations working in the 
international development arena, based on what the Bank 
found. Before turning to the Bank’s study, however, we first 
briefly situate the study within the broader context in which 
those offering policy advice, such as the Bank’s staff, operate.
Making Decisions in a Complex World
Many factors influence how decision-makers respond to 
evidence. Faced with the complex reality of the world, decision-
making is rarely simply a technical process, where decisions 
can be made simply by feeding data into an algorithm.3 To 
take just a few examples, first there may be multiple objectives 
that are being pursued, such as improving healthcare while 
constraining costs. Second, the impact of a decision may vary 
over time, as when short-term savings lead to greater long-
term costs, so that choices may be determined by the electoral 
cycle. Third, there may be winners and losers. Nearly all major 
public policy decisions involve a degree of redistribution and 
whether that is seen as acceptable depends on many factors, 
including the ability of each group to articulate its interests 
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and the dominant political ideology. Fourth, and regrettably 
common, there may be hidden agendas, including corruption 
and vested interests. 
Even when the goals are clear and agreed upon, there are 
many factors that influence what knowledge is used to inform 
decisions and how it is used.4 For example, decision-makers 
may or may not draw on both explicit and tacit knowledge, 
the former capable of being stated, usually with reference to 
published work, while the latter is often unstated, associated 
with experience of what does or does not work in particular 
circumstances.5 They might use this knowledge in ways that 
are instrumental, leading to changes in behaviour and practice; 
conceptual, to achieve changes in knowledge, understanding 
and attitudes; or symbolic, to add legitimacy to decisions 
they have already made.6 Thus, as this brief and, of necessity, 
selective review shows, decision-making in public policy is 
complicated and there are rarely answers that are definitively 
“right” or “wrong.” However, there may be some things that 
can be done to ensure that those decisions that are made are at 
least consistent with the goals that the organisation has made 
explicit and that knowledge that is cited is drawn on accurately 
and used effectively for achieving those goals. To this end, the 
researchers preparing the 2015 World Development Report2 
focussed on one discrete issue that affects how World Bank 
staff make decisions. This is the role played by cognitive 
biases, where different people, presented with the same 
evidence, reach very different conclusions.7 
What are Cognitive Biases?
Cognitive biases gained widespread attention following the 
publication of a seminal study by Tversky and Kahneman, 
in 1974, who showed how people use heuristics, or mental 
shortcuts, when faced with complex choices.8 They argued 
that these were often the only practical way that a decision 
could be made and thus had considerable practical value, 
although they also carried considerable risk of mistakes. 
These came about when the decision-making process involved 
cognitive biases. These include ignoring relevant information 
or placing undue emphasis on unimportant, though salient 
aspects of the issue (anchoring). There are many different 
types of cognitive bias but specific examples that may 
influence decision-making include confirmation bias, where 
individuals seek out information from sources likely to take 
the same view that they do,9 self-serving bias, where they 
evaluate evidence in ways that are likely to be advantageous to 
their interests,10 belief bias, where the strength of the evidence 
is assessed according to whether one agrees with the resulting 
conclusion,11 and framing bias, where the social construction 
of the issue increases the probability of particular decisions 
being made (Box).12 
What the World Bank Did
The Bank’s researchers explored four issues related to bias 
and the circumstances in which it may arise: complexity; 
confirmation bias; sunk cost bias, and an inability to place 
oneself in the situation of others. While recognising that there 
are others that could be examined, we will now review in turn 
how they addressed each of these.
As noted above, many decisions involve complexity, in which 
policy-makers must decide among multiple options. The 
World Bank researchers illustrate the challenges involved 
with a study in which physicians were presented with a 
scenario involving a patient with chronic hip pain.17 Half 
were told they could choose between immediate referral for 
possible surgery and initiation of a specific medical treatment 
that, they were told, had not yet been tried in that patient. The 
other half were given the same options plus a third, referral 
and a second treatment. Significantly more chose referral 
alone, the simplest option, when confronted with the more 
complex scenario, suggesting that the addition of even a very 
minor increment in complexity can cause people to adopt 
the easiest course, even if it means denying the patient a 
potentially effective treatment. 
The Bank’s researchers also highlight the importance of 
framing. Here they cite a seminal study by Tversky and 
Kahneman, in which some subjects are confronted with a 
situation in which, if they do nothing, a third of the population 
will live but if they act there is a 33% chance of saving everyone 
and a 66% chance of saving no one.18 Others face a situation 
in which, if nothing is done, two-thirds of the population will 
definitely die but if they act there is a 33% chance that no-one 
will die and a 66% chance that everyone will die. Of course, 
the two scenarios are numerically identical but those given 
the first scenario, framed in terms of gains, preferred certainty 
Box. Selected Examples of Cognitive Bias
• Framing bias was demonstrated by Parkhurst in a study of how it influenced assessments of the effectiveness of the 
ABC (‘abstinence, be faithful, and correct and consistent condom use’) policy advocated to reduce HIV transmission 
in Uganda.13 He shows how those involved in the exchange of information interpret the evidence in the light of their 
“internally consistent belief systems” which led to different conclusions.14 
• Confirmation bias was apparent in a study where volunteers were given the opportunity to search online for information 
to answer a question posed to them and had their eye movements and mouse clicks are tracked. They systematically 
searched out evidence from sources they thought will support them and disregarded evidence from sources with which 
they disagreed.15 
• Belief bias was seen in a randomised controlled trial conducted with American subjects who were first divided according 
to their political allegiance and then randomly allocated one of four authoritative narratives about diabetes, no specific 
cause (control), genes, lifestyle choices, and the social environment. Democrats receiving the narrative setting out the 
social factors, such as the well-established obesogenic environment, were more likely than controls to support collective 
action while Republicans became less likely to support it.16 
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and avoided the risk of action. Those faced with the second 
scenario, framed in terms of losses, were much more likely to 
take a chance. Even though this experiment is well-known, 
when the Bank researchers replicated it among Bank staff they 
found that framing was important; 75% chose certainty when 
faced with the gain framing but only 34% of those presented 
with the loss framing did so.
Confirmation bias exists where individuals systematically 
search for evidence that supports their preconceived view 
and discard evidence that challenges it, as in the examples 
cited earlier. Importantly, this is not a matter of ability to 
understand information. The Bank researchers cite an earlier 
study in which individuals were presented with identical 
data, but framed either in relation to the effectiveness of skin 
cream (uncontentious) or gun control (highly contentious).19 
Greater numeracy did help overall interpretation of the data 
framed as a skin cream issue but was only beneficial among 
those who were already supportive of gun control. Indeed, 
the strongest determinant of getting the right answer was 
the subject’s prior belief. The Bank researchers replicated the 
experiment, retaining the skin cream example and replacing 
gun control with legislation for a minimum wage, comparing 
those who supported one of two conflicting statements on the 
desirability of reducing income inequality. As in the original 
study, the main determinant of whether a subject correctly 
interpreted the data framed as a wage issue was their prior 
belief.
The researchers also looked at a bias that is of particular 
relevance to a development agency such as the Bank. This is 
“sunk cost bias,” whereby, even where there is clear evidence of 
failure, subjects told that a higher proportion of the budget for 
a project has already been spent are more likely to support the 
project’s continuation.20 The Bank researchers tested for this 
by giving staff a series of scenarios in which the proportion 
of total funds committed for a conservation project increased 
but the provincial government announced a hydroelectric 
programme that would mean that none of the benefits would 
be realised. Even though the two schemes were totally in 
conflict, support for continuation of the conservation scheme 
increased as the sunk costs became higher. Although there 
are other possible explanations, such as an unwillingness to 
concede failure, the observation that this increasing support 
grew linearly with greater sunk costs indicates that this 
particular bias was important. 
A final set of  biases, again especially relevant in a development 
agency, arise from what the Bank staff described as the 
inability of one group of people to put themselves in the situation 
of another, although this might be described more succinctly 
as an inability to empathise. Wealthy people, such as World 
Bank staff and consultants, tend to prioritise time over money. 
Thus, when asked if they would drive for 45 minutes to save 
$50, they might do so when they can get a $150 purchase for 
$100 but are less likely to do so if they are saving the same 
amount on a $500 purchase.21 For a poor person, the absolute 
value, in terms of time, of saving $50 is the same whatever 
the base cost. Once again, the Bank researchers were able to 
confirm this in a comparison of Bank staff and low-income 
inhabitants of Nairobi. The researchers also asked Bank staff 
about how they felt poor people in Lima, Jakarta, and Nairobi 
would respond to questions on the control they had over 
their lives and to compare it with how they themselves would 
answer. They considered that the poor in these three cities 
would express high levels of helplessness but in fact poor 
people had views that were much closer to those of Bank staff. 
Conclusion
It is not enough to produce more research. What we are 
learning from cognitive psychology is that, even when armed 
with evidence, and a willingness to use it, “good people 
can make bad decisions.”2 In this way, perversely, the best-
intentioned researchers can inadvertently work against the 
interests of those they are meant to be helping. Crucially, 
cognitive biases can be remarkably resistant to change. Thus, 
even when false statements are corrected by an authoritative 
source, if the original statement aligns with the prior beliefs 
of the subject, the correction often simply reinforces the false 
belief.22 
There are several possible remedies. The first is recognition of 
the problem. Awareness that these biases exist and often lead 
to bad decisions can help safeguard against their influence. 
The second is to put in place measures that can improve 
decision-making. For example, confirmation bias may be 
addressed by ensuring that a diversity of views are considered. 
In the military, so-called red teaming involves bringing in a 
group who will challenge, in an adversarial manner, the 
key assumptions underpinning the decision.23 There is also 
a range of formal decision analysis tools that can be used. 
Similarly, sunk cost bias can be addressed by creating a culture 
that is less punitive and enable open and frank discussion 
about errors, recognising that when things go wrong there are 
opportunities to learn lessons for the future. A third approach 
is to set up institutional mechanisms to ‘reverse the nouns’ 
— encouraging those involved in development to take steps 
to look at the programs they are supporting through the 
eyes of those who are using them. There is a growing body 
of multimethod research that seeks to do this, identifying 
the challenges that users of health and other services face 
on an everyday basis and tracing back through the system to 
identify the causes of these problems.24,25 
National and international organisations have much to learn 
from this valuable exercise undertaken by the World Bank. 
All organisations, and individuals, make mistakes. Some do 
so with remarkable regularity. It is much less common to find 
one that is willing to acknowledge its mistakes, to assess and 
confront its biases, and to put in place policies and practices 
to overcome them. A first step is to begin to understand the 
subconscious biases, and the cultures that perpetuate them, 
which impact us all.
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